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Lucas G. Martín1 
 
 
What relationship to justice is established when an attempt is made to 
respond to the legacy of a criminal regime in the context of a new democratic 
beginning? To respond to this question, we must confront both the question 
of the foundation of a new democracy as well as the need for justice that 
accompanies this new beginning. On the following pages, I will offer 
interpretations of the different yet exemplary forms of responding to this 
question in Argentina, Uruguay and South Africa at the end of the last 
century. To do so, I will compare and contrast these three experiences in an 
attempt to shed light on an issue that is difficult to approach and entails 
certain debts. 
Our approach is based on two premises and one hypothesis. The 
first premise is also a fact: after criminal regimes, justice must have a place. 
According to our second premise, this justice requires establishing a 
relationship with the perpetrators, that is, justice entails a common law and 
the recognition of a bond of humanity even with the criminals. This idea is 
inspired in a well-known speech by Saint-Just during the debate on the trial 
of Louis XVI. The National Convention was trying to decide whether to try 
Louis Capet as a citizen or not bring him to trial as Louis XVI, that is, the king, 
and thus inviolable according to the French Constitution of 1791. Saint-Just 
opposed letting him off based on the following argument: “To judge means to 
apply the law. A law is a legal relationship: what legal relationship is there 
between humanity and a king?”2 The young Jacobin thus set forth the 
tyrannicide argument, denying any connection between Louis XVI and the 
French people, between the tyrant and humanity. Given our first premise (and 
thus rejecting tyrannicide), what interests me about Saint-Just’s discourse is: 
the understanding of justice as a relationship, a human bond. 
Using this as our basis, we believe it is possible to acknowledge that 
different forms of this necessary relationship of justice can be established in 
post-traumatic times, forms that depend on the different place given to the 
other legitimate ends that are sought out simultaneously with justice. By 
                                                        
1 This text is a slightly modified version of my article “Regímenes criminales, 
refundaciones democráticas y formas de justicia (Argentina, Sudáfrica, Uruguay),” 
published in Claudia Hilb, Philippe-Joseph Salazar and Lucas Martín (eds.), Lesa 
humanidad. Reflexiones después del Mal, (Buenos Aires: Katz, 2014). 
2 November 13, 1792. Reproduced in Michael Walzer, Régicide et révolution. Le 
procès de Louis XVI. Discours et controverses, (Paris: Éditions Payot, 1989): 202-211. 
~ Lucas G. Martín ~ 
 
 
~ 82 ~ 
 
legitimate ends, I am referring to the goals that are in some degree 
connected to justice and to democracy as a polity that enables justice: 
returning the dignity of the victims, establishing the truth, strengthening 
democracy or democratic peace, not repeating the past (the concept of 
“Nunca Más”), promoting a culture of human rights and elaborating a 
collective memory of a traumatic past. 
These are the characteristics of the issue we will address in this 
article. In the comparison of the three experiences of justice during the 
founding of new democracies, we will follow an analytical order, which we 
consider more fitting than a chronological one.  
 
Argentina 
 
The form of justice – the type of human bond – that was established in 
Argentina with the perpetrators of aberrant crimes was retributive, criminal 
justice. The criminals were brought to court to answer for their actions based 
on a common law. Without that acknowledgement of a common bond, 
without the inclusion of the community, it would not have been possible to 
apply the law, try the perpetrators, or establish a relationship of justice. The 
Trial of the Juntas was not a scene of revenge but a relationship of justice and 
humanity in which the perpetrators were recognised as autonomous and 
equal individuals. As autonomous individuals, they were responsible for their 
actions; and as equal individuals, they could be tried according to a common 
law. Because autonomy exists, an act becomes an action; but there is crime 
and a relationship of (retributive) justice because there is a common 
(criminal) law.3   
Now, if their autonomy was necessarily assumed, it was also staged 
in different ways: for example, with the consent of the dictators to appear in 
court. The term consent does not suggest that the dictators willingly 
presented themselves but that, aware of the fact that they would be arrested 
and tried by civil courts, they did not flee or take up arms. On the contrary, 
they appeared in court, standing tall and giving evidence of their sound mind; 
they hired their own lawyers and even in some cases exercised their right to 
speak in their own defense. During the same scene of the trial, they argued 
that the trial was illegitimate. That is, they defended themselves on the 
proposed stage. This same autonomy was also expressed both before and 
after the trial through the former dictators’ voluntary refusal to acknowledge 
the judicial process, though this time off the judicial stage. This denial as 
another indicator of autonomy was manifested in the underground or 
anonymous threats that were made against a democratic government4 and in 
                                                        
3 Cf. Carlos S. Nino, Juicio al mal absoluto, (Buenos Aires: Emecé editores, 1997). 
4 In this context, however, no direct threats were made against any of the court judges. 
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the former dictators’ decision to maintain total silence ipso jure with respect 
to the crimes they had masterminded. For better or for worse, autonomy was 
also present there. It was autonomy that was ultimately assumed by the crime 
they had committed, staged in their appearance in court, silent before society 
and threatening behind the scene. 
In the same way as their autonomy, their equality was assumed and 
also staged. It was assumed in virtue of the rule of law, which should apply to 
any crime, even crimes committed under a previous regime. Above all else, 
this equality was staged during the Trial of the Juntas, which supplied an 
image of the nine dictators following the orders of the court, an image that 
continues to accompany commemorations of the return to democracy as the 
most eloquent staging of equality before the law.5 
Autonomy and equality were the basis for this relationship of justice, 
the basis of a new human bond. As has been said on countless occasions, 
the dictators received exactly what they had denied their victims: a trial with 
due process. 
 However, we must also say that due to its political nature, to the fact 
that it was shaped in the setting of a new political order, the judicial stage was 
more than a judicial stage and less than a judicial stage at the same time. It 
was more than a judicial stage because of its symbolic potential, because it 
presented the implementation of a new polity. In this regard, it was not only 
the instantiation of a lawsuit aimed at compensating the victims for damages 
but also the certification of a new form of cohabitation (the most radical form 
of cohabitation, I would say, according to which we must live with the 
perpetrators under the same law). At the same time, it was less than a judicial 
stage because justice could not appear as an impartial third party when it was 
bringing two political systems face to face with one another. One was a 
humane system, because it established relationships of justice; the other, an 
inhumane regime, because it was based on crime and terror; the first was 
represented by the judges and the second was embodied in each of the 
dictators.  
 In terms of what has been said here about the Argentine case, I want 
to emphasize the way retributive justice focuses on the perpetrator: he is 
accused, he is judged, he is discussed and he is guaranteed a defense during 
his trial. The other aspect I want to focus on is the particular balance between 
autonomy and heteronomy that was established in the trial. These were the 
coordinates that made it possible to try the criminals for their actions under 
the terms of justice and humanity, without reifying them, without exiling the 
perpetrators under the terms of war or demonising them. 
                                                                                                                               
Cf. Pepe Eliaschev, Los hombres del juicio, (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 2011). 
5 Cf. Hugo Vezzetti, Pasado y presente. Guerra, dictadura y sociedad en la Argentina, 
(Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 2001). 
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South Africa 
 
South Africa established another human bond, another form of justice. This 
was reparative justice, that is, justice oriented primarily towards compensating 
victims for damages, towards “healing” and returning the victims’ dignity. In 
this regard, the country proposed a unique exchange that required all of the 
perpetrators (those who were part of the apartheid regime as well as the 
armed opposition) to provide full disclosure, not just general descriptions or 
abstract mea culpa, of politically motivated crimes they had committed. In 
exchange for their confessions, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
was created to grant amnesties for all of the political crimes confessed. This 
way, the perpetrator could be granted amnesty for one crime but not 
necessarily be granted amnesty for a second, third or fourth crime. 
Although it can be argued that this form of justice adopts a clear 
strategic rationale – the well-known device of the carrot and the stick—what 
makes it particularly unique in our view are four elements that define the 
process of truth and reconciliation: the central role of the victim, the 
democratic responsibility, the ethical dimension and the openness towards 
the action of the perpetrators. 
 The first element, that is, justice oriented first and foremost towards 
the victims, can best be seen in how it differs from retributive justice. The 
latter focuses on the victimisers, on the guilt or innocence of the accused, 
and the evidence for the criminal acts is based on the testimony of the 
victims. In reparative justice, in contrast, the crimes are analyzed separately to 
offer a response to each victim.6 In the first case, a response is given for each 
victimiser accused of crimes; in the second, a response is given for every 
victim who asks for truth but also from every victimiser who voluntarily 
presents himself as a perpetrator and as an offeror of truth towards his 
victims or towards their family members.7 The South African experience thus 
teaches us that what appears to be the sheer notion of justice – in other 
words, returning dignity to the victim – may require focusing on the victim 
and not, at least not necessarily or not above all else, persecuting the 
victimizer. Naturally, the threat of the South African victimisers being tried 
persisted, to the point where it could be argued that the significance of the 
actions of the TRC greatly depended on whether at least some of the 
perpetrators who did not respond to the offer to exchange truth for liberty 
could be obliged to provide an account of their actions. It depended, in other 
words, on following through on that promise of the stick.8 
                                                        
6 Cf. Philippe-Joseph Salazar, “Récit, réconciliation, reconnaissance, à propos des 
perpetrators et de l’amnistie en Afrique du Sud”, s.d. p. 9.  
7 Cf. Philippe-Joseph Salazar, “Un conversion politique du religieux”, Le genre 
humain, 43, November (Paris: Seuil, 2004): 62-63. 
8 On this topic, see Charles Villa-Vicencio and Erik Doxtader, The provocations of 
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The second feature of the responsibility attributed to the representatives of 
the South African people is the creation of a bond of trust that would lay the 
foundations for the incipient democracy. In this regard, South Africans mis-
trusted retributive justice and its effects – and perhaps continue to do so even 
today. Unlike the significance of the Trial of the Juntas in Argentina, the re-
tributive form of justice was viewed in South Africa as a kind of vendetta, 
revenge or reprisal, one that would revive and prolong the conflicts that peo-
ple wanted to leave in the past. From this perspective, criminal retribution 
would obstruct the “historic bridge” between past and future that South Afri-
cans hoped to build, a bridge that required the consent of the victimisers, 
who would have refused to sit back and watch as a door opened for judicial 
revenge. With regards to the heavy burden that was thus being imposed on 
millions of victims, President Thabo Mbeki said:  
 
Together, we decided that in the search for a solution to our prob-
lems, nobody should be demonised or excluded. We agreed that eve-
rybody should become part of the solution, whatever they might have 
done and represented in the past. We agreed that we would not have 
any war crimes tribunals or take the road of revenge and retribution. 
…We said that as the majority, we had a responsibility to make our 
day of liberation an unforgettable moment of joy, with none con-
demned to remember it forever as a day of bitter tears.9  
 
This aspect of the South African solution reminds us of the feeling of 
“crushing responsibility” that led the Athenian democrats to grant amnesty to 
the oligarchs after defeating them in the civil war that put an end to the 
tyranny of the Thirty in the year 403BC. The victors could have used their 
new sovereignty (kurios) to try the defeated. However, the democrats 
experienced the superiority of their victory with a “crushing responsibility”,10 
and thus decided to grant an amnesty (though not to the Thirty) as a way of 
                                                                                                                               
amnesty. Memory, justice and impunity, (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers/Institute 
for Justice and Reconciliation, 2003). 
9 See Thabo Mbeki, “Statement to the National Houses of Parliament and the Nation, 
at the Tabling of the Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission”, in Philippe-
Joseph Salazar and Erik Doxtader, Truth and reconciliation in South Africa. The 
fundamental documents, (Cape Town: New Africa Books, 2007): 460. See also in this 
volume the ruling of the Constitutional Court in response to a lawsuit for access to 
(retributive) justice: “Judgment in the matter of AZAPO, Biko, Mwenge, Riberio v. The 
President of South Africa, The Government of South Africa, The Minister of Justice, 
The Minister of Safety and Security, The Chairperson of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, Constitutional Court of South Africa, 1996”,  p. 31. 
10 Nicole Loraux, La cité divisée: L'Oubli dans la mémoire d'Athènes, (Paris: Payot, 
1997): 260-261. 
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renouncing their superiority (kratos). According to the classification by 
Aristotle, kratos is what situated demokratia within a set of polities in which 
one part of the city imposed itself on the other, that is, within tyrannical 
regimes.11 By renouncing this kratos of democracy, the Athenians founded a 
regime that took the name of all of the constitutional regimes, the politeia, a 
system of equality in which no one’s will was imposed on others, leaving a 
legacy in which politics was joined to the polis. 
In the South African experience, it is possible to hear the echo of that 
crushing responsibility : in both experiences, retributive justice is perceived as 
a threat for both democracy and for the perpetrators, who must be 
incorporated to the new polity, in the new relationship of justice and humanity 
that was in the making. This is the notion as understood by the South African 
constituent assembly in 1993 when agreeing on the need for amnesty. They 
argued that the conflicts of the past and the legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and 
vengeance had to be overcome, as noted in the epilogue to the Interim 
Constitution, through a “need for understanding but not for vengeance, a 
need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not for 
victimisation”.12 
The judicial threat had to be limited to what was agreed on with the 
perpetrators and framed in the spirit of reconciliation and ubuntu that 
inspired the new democratic beginning. This is the third element: the ethical 
dimension, the dimension of reconciliation and brotherhood, of generous 
humanity in relation to the other that the term ubuntu refers to13 and that 
which established the basis for the South African solution. In addition, at the 
ethical level, revenge, demonisation and a threat of an eye-for-an-eye 
retribution were prohibited. In the words of D. Tutu and N. Mandela, in order 
for there to be a democracy that allowed freedom in South Africa, the 
perpetrators had to be included in this democracy, and to achieve this, these 
perpetrators also had to be set free.14 This ethic of liberation assumed a 
particular balance between autonomy and heteronomy that expanded the 
                                                        
11 See Politics: Book III by Aristotle. Cf. Loraux, La cité divisée, 259-260; also Barbara 
Cassin: “Politiques de la mémoire. Des traitements de la haine”, Multitudes, 9 (6), 
2001, 177-196, (http://multitudes.samizdat.net/Politiques-de-la-memoire). 
12 Salazar and Doxtader, Truth and reconciliation in South Africa, 5, 29-32. 
13 This humanist philosophy is reflected in the Zulu proverb “umuntu, ngumntu 
ngabantu!” which could be translated as “people are people through other people”. 
Cf. Wilhelm Verwoerd “Towards the recognition of our past injustices”, in Charles Villa-
Vicencio and Wilhelm Verwoerd, Looking back, reaching forward. Reflections on the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, (London/Cape Town: University 
of Cape Town Press/Zed Books Ltd., 2000), 158; and Philippe-Joseph Salazar, 
Amnistier l’apartheid. Travaux de la Commission Vérité et Réconciliation, (Paris: 
Éditions du Seuil, 2004). 
14 See Jacques Derrida, “Versöhnung, ubuntu, pardon: quel genre?” in Le Genre 
Humain. 
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figure of the victim to include the perpetrators. “In the larger sense, we were 
all victims of the system of apartheid, both black and white.”15 It is a notable 
contrast with Argentine justice, whose retributive nature was based on 
incriminating the military retroactively for their crimes, on equality before the 
law and on the autonomy of the perpetrators; in the South African 
experience, equality and liberty were reestablished by acknowledging their 
absence in a past of injustice. The goal was for all South Africans to make the 
words of the preamble to the 1996 Constitution their own: “We, the people of 
South Africa, recognise the injustices of our past.”16 Everyone was a victim of 
a lack of acknowledgment by the other, of the lack of democracy, of the lack 
of humanity and ubuntu.17 Democracy had to be restored for all the victims, 
that is, all South Africans. 
The fourth element of the form of South African justice is derived 
from the first three. The South Africans proposed transforming the 
perpetrators into “active, full and creative members of the new order.”18 The 
condition placed on perpetrators was the public offering of a self-condemning 
truth (repentance was not a condition, though occasionally it appeared) open 
to public indictment. A defensive and self-offensive act, interested and 
disinterested at the same time. A new shared space was thus created among 
South Africans and potentially also among the perpetrators themselves, a 
space in which the perpetrators could acknowledge their crimes and testify on 
what they had done. They could thus move away from that which they were, 
disidentify and be born again (politically), to borrow the terms of Hannah 
Arendt.19 
These four elements – the priority of the victim, democratic 
responsibility, the ethic of ubuntu and the transformation of the perpetrators – 
distinguish the new form of South African reparative justice and its human 
relationship. Here a new equality among citizens is seen, one that joins on the 
same stage those who had been segregated under apartheid law and violence 
                                                        
15 Salazar and Doxtader, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa, 467. 
16 Verwoerd, “Towards the recognition…” and Derrida, “Versöhnung, ubuntu, 
pardon…”. 
17 On this recognition of the experience of the dehumanisation of the humane by 
politics, see Ph-J. Salazar “La reconciliación como modo de vida ética de la 
república”, in C. Hilb, Ph-J. Salazar and L. Martín (eds), Lesa Humanidad (Buenos 
Aires: Katz, 2014): 161-180. Also see Verwoerd, “Towards the recognition…”, 158-
159. 
18 I return to the terms of the already cited ruling “AZAPO…” of the Constitutional 
Court, in Doxtader and Salazar, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa, 31. 
19 On the central role of the perpetrators and their conversion into founding fathers, 
see the articles by Ph-J. Salazar (“Une conversion politique du religieux”) and by B. 
Cassin (“Amnistie et pardon: pour une ligne de partage entre éthique et politique”) in 
the already cited issue of the magazine Le genre humain. On Arendt, see The Human 
Condition, (Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press, 1958). 
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only a short time earlier. All were now allowed to speak and be heard, and 
thus a transaction between victims and perpetrators was staged in the 
exchange of truth for freedom as the promise of a new polity of citizenship. 
 
Uruguay 
 
The last question that remains is the relationship of justice, if such a 
relationship indeed existed, in Uruguay. An amnesty law in Uruguay 
eliminated the possibility of bring the perpetrators to trial and it took years to 
reach an official and public version of the truth about the crimes of the past.20 
In 1986, when military officers refused to respond to court summons, 
the Uruguayan Parliament passed the so-called the Expiry Law (No. 15,848). 
This law granted a general amnesty for all crimes of a political nature 
committed by the members of the armed forces and police. There were 
arguments to justify this decision, which was equated with the amnesty 
already granted to political prisoners who had not committed murder; the 
need to turn the page on the painful internal war; the previous civil-military 
accords on the transition to democracy; and the assurance of social peace 
and democratic stability. Though challenged by human rights organisations 
and leftist parties, who called for a referendum in April 1989, the law would 
obtain the majority at the polls with 56% of the popular vote.21 
What can be said of the amnesty voted by the people? What can be 
said of this democratic form of responding to the legacy of violence and 
terror? Is it an act of justice or is it pure injustice on the part of the demos? 
We can say that in Uruguay, there was no retributive form of justice, there 
were no trials, just as there was no truth that could generate reparative 
justice, although the amnesty law expressly stated that all reported crimes 
should be investigated.22 Could it be said that the demos acted unjustly in 
Uruguay from all perspectives?  
It is possible that Uruguayans believed that through the mere 
manifestation of the democratic form of power, the popular vote, an act of 
                                                        
20 President Battle did not create the Peace Commission until the year 2000. The 
commission’s work continued until 2003. 
21 See Diego Achard, La transición en Uruguay. Apuntes para su interpretación, 
(Montevideo: Ingenio en Servicios de Comunicación y Marketing/ Instituto Wilson 
Ferreira Aldunate, 1992); Eugenia Allier Montaño, Batallas por la memoria. Los usos 
políticos del pasado reciente en Uruguay, (Mexico/Montevideo: UNAM/Instituto de 
Investigaciones Sociales/Ediciones Trilce, 2010). 
22 According to Article 4 of the law, “The Executive Branch will immediately order 
investigations aimed at clarifying these acts. Within twenty days of receiving court 
notification of the criminal report, the Executive Branch will inform the accusers of the 
result of these investigations and will supply them with all of the information 
gathered”. 
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justice would be done. According to this view, democracy appeared as the 
only fair system and this act of voting and at the same time granting amnesty 
staged an unquestionable victory of democracy over dictatorship. From this 
perspective, like the Athenian democrats in 403BC, this act of justice was the 
expression of democratic power as the only legitimate power. Duplicating it 
through a second act of (retributive) justice could be taken as impressing the 
kratos of democracy upon the idea of impartial justice, that is, as a 
demonstration of the superiority of one part of society over another.  This 
ultimate superposition of the power of the demos and of fair retribution would 
necessarily involve double jeopardy, expressing superiority and thus becoming 
a reprisal or a vendetta of the conquering democrats against the conquered 
tyrants. In a word: it would appear an act of injustice, an act that creates new 
damage and a new victim, in this case, the perpetrators of the past. To 
paraphrase Nicole Loraux, whose interpretation I am following here, it is as if 
the Uruguayan people, in the moment in which democracy is established as 
the sole polity that adopts the language of the just and the unjust, knowing or 
wanting to be the victor, had strived to clearly establish in its collective 
memory that it had not acted unjustly.23 In exchange, the Uruguayans 
incurred in a permanent and unpayable debt with the victims, a debt that it 
has perhaps only begun to acknowledge over the past decade. This debt was 
incurred, however, in perhaps the only form in which such a lack (of justice, in 
fact) could become a debt: democratically, through an amnesty put to the 
people’s vote. 
One final hypothesis: beyond preventing what could have been 
considered double jeopardy and a fair popular decision to not bring the 
unjust to trial, it is possible that the Uruguayan demos may not have wanted 
to publically highlight a division that it already experienced as 
insurmountable. Especially because, due to the fact that this division had to 
be overcome by drawing a line between the just and the unjust, the 
Uruguayans may not have wanted to expose this with a show of force. The 
contrast with the case of Argentina may shed light on this idea: one thing is 
depicting the division of society in a court scene and providing compensation 
for the victims and sentences for the victimizers, all in following with a 
common law and the authority of the judges. Another thing altogether would 
be exposing that same division on the stage in which the demos manifests 
their will and their political sovereignty. Would it be possible to imagine a 
more punitive form of retributive justice, one more radical in the division it 
establishes by separating the just from the unjust, one less based on the 
promise of a human bond, than that in which the people, expressed through 
a majority, embodied in their leaders, take the place of the judge? From this 
perspective, it is possible to read the Uruguayan referendum as an expression 
                                                        
23 Loraux, La cité divisée, 277. 
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of the “crushing responsibility” we spoke of earlier. Especially considering the 
feeling that weighed on the supporters of retributive justice before the 
referendum. In the words of one of these supporters, “On March 1, 1985, the 
world was our oyster, we were on top, and everything was in reach”.24 
 
The forms, the ends and the outstanding debts 
 
On these pages, we have compared and contrasted three forms of justice in 
the foundation of new polities: retributive justice in the case of Argentina, 
reparative or restorative justice in the case of South Africa, and democratic 
justice in the case of Uruguay. To summarise, we can say that through 
criminal trials, Argentina focused on the victimisers, making them responsible 
for their actions and equal under a common law. In South Africa, the process 
of truth and reconciliation focused on the victims, who were offered the truth 
as recounted by the perpetrators who wished to become free citizens in the 
new democracy. Finally, in Uruguay a general amnesty was granted in a 
referendum that also manifested democratic legitimacy as the only rule for 
cohabiting on equal grounds. 
  At the beginning of this article, we said that justice is a human bond 
and an end to itself, one necessary in new post-traumatic beginnings. It takes 
different forms according to the way in which it has historically related to 
other “ultimate” ends: the dignity returned to the victims, the truth, 
democracy, the construction of a culture in which human rights are 
respected, peace, Nunca Más. The notion of one particular form of justice is 
thus disregarded here, and we wish to emphasise certain lessons: that justice 
can mean bringing to trial those who considered themselves above a 
common law; that it can mean concentrating on the victims instead of the 
victimizers; and finally, that it may require emphasising the legitimacy of 
democracy as the only fair polity. 
At the same time, the marks left by these other ends on the forms of 
justice indicate that there may be outstanding debts other than those not 
accounted for when justice is served only partially. These debts are the ones 
incurred when a country opts for one particular form of justice, prioritizing 
certain ends over others. There are debts in relation to the truth, in the case 
where the focus was on retribution or on the demos; debts with regards to 
criminal law, where the search for truth or the popular will took priority; and 
debts related to the ties between justice and the demos, when the search for 
truth or the desire to punish the perpetrators took precedence. 
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24 Quoted by Ollier Montaño, Batallas por la memoria, 102. 
